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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: WHAT A 
COMPARISON WITH THE NEW POLISH LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK OF ARBITRATION REVEALS 
ABOUT THE U.S. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF 
ARBITRATION† 
ADAM J. SULKOWSKI∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Domestic and international arbitration in Poland is regulated by the 
Civil Procedure Code. In October of 2005, a new set of regulations went 
into effect that completely altered the Polish legal framework for 
arbitration. A comparison of this framework with that of the United States 
reveals several similarities and a few key differences. These differences 
involve the power of arbitrators to decide upon their own jurisdiction, the 
arbitrability of employment disputes and the consequences of an 
arbitrator’s failure to consider applicable national law.  
A comparison of how similar cases would be resolved under new 
Polish standards versus U.S. standards raises the question of how U.S. 
standards evolved and whether they are truly the most desirable or 
practical. Ultimately, as a result of this comparison, the author concludes 
that Congress should amend the Federal Arbitration Act to eliminate 
certain troublesome ambiguities. 
 
 
 † This exercise in comparative law is intended to highlight how the relevant provisions of the 
Polish Code of Civil Procedure are in some ways more logical than the U.S. legal framework of 
arbitration. The phrase “through the looking glass” is obviously borrowed from Lewis Carroll. Upon 
reading this Article, the reader will appreciate how the metaphor of Alice encountering seemingly 
illogical absurdities in Wonderland more aptly applies to practitioners dealing with U.S. jurisprudence 
than the Polish framework governing arbitration. In the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, “a page of 
history is worth a volume of logic” for the purposes of understanding seemingly illogical practices in 
common law jurisdictions. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). This Article is 
part of a growing chorus suggesting that it is time for Congress to take action to reform the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) and mitigate some egregious idiosyncrasies and inconsistencies. The title of 
this Article was chosen before realizing that this is a continuation of a distinguished tradition of co-
opting the “looking glass” metaphor for use in the titles of scholarly legal works. See, e.g., J.H.H. 
Weiler & Ulrich R. Haltern, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order—Through the Looking 
Glass, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411 (1996).  
 ∗ Assistant Professor of Business Law, Charlton College of Business, University of 
Massachusetts Dartmouth; J.D./M.B.A, Boston College. The author would like to thank his former 
colleague, Dr. Andrzej Tynel, partner at the Warsaw, Poland office of Baker & McKenzie, for his 
assistance in understanding the precise meaning and implications of recent changes to Polish law. In 
addition to his time at Baker & McKenzie, the author has worked at the Warsaw offices of White & 
Case. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Public laws provide a framework for the enforcement of both 
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards, as well as a guide as to when 
such awards should be nullified. The framework of U.S. law governing 
arbitration has attracted scrutiny and debate largely because of the tension 
between, on the one hand, the desirability of arbitration as an efficient and 
discrete vehicle for dispute resolution and, on the other, concerns that 
arbitration may compromise the enforcement of mandatory statutory 
protections and due process rights. Arbitral procedures, it is argued, can 
lack transparency, public accountability and procedural safeguards, and 
may place non-lawyers in the position of having to accurately interpret 
statutes that serve important public policy objectives. 
Comparing U.S. laws to those of Poland results in the realization that 
U.S. standards are not always perfectly consistent, logical or desirable. 
U.S. courts are sometimes criticized for being too permissive of arbitration 
when it may compromise procedural due process or substantive rights, but 
they do not encourage arbitration in all situations. In some instances, U.S. 
jurisprudence appears to unreasonably favor the enforcement of arbitral 
outcomes.  
This Article begins with a review of U.S. arbitration law. Next, this 
Article highlights the most significant reforms to the Polish legal 
framework of arbitration. The most significant differences between the 
U.S. and Polish frameworks are then explored. This comparison reveals 
that U.S. law is sometimes not the most conducive to arbitration, nor, from 
a policy perspective, is it the most desirable for arbitration. Ultimately, 
some of the inconsistencies and uncertainty surrounding U.S. arbitration 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss1/4
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law are attributable to the U.S.’s common law tradition and its federalist 
structure. One possible solution to these shortcomings, discussed in this 
Article, is for Congress to reform the Federal Arbitration Act. 
II. THE U.S. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ARBITRATION 
Since 1925, the most important component of U.S. arbitration law has 
been the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).1 Congress enacted the FAA to 
“revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”2 The 
FAA provides that written agreements to arbitrate in the context of 
interstate and international commercial transactions shall be enforceable, 
except “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract.”3 The FAA allows courts to compel arbitration where 
there is a valid agreement to arbitrate but where one party refuses to 
submit to arbitration.4 The FAA also allows courts to confirm or enforce 
arbitral awards.5 The only grounds stated in the FAA for vacating an 
arbitral award are fraud, partiality or corruption of an arbitrator, arbitrator 
misconduct and lack of jurisdiction.6  
Chapter Two of the FAA was added to implement the 1958 United 
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”).7 Chapter Three was added 
to implement the 1975 Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration (the “Panama Convention”).8 These Conventions 
require the courts of contracting states to compel arbitration arising under 
a valid arbitration agreement and to enforce properly rendered foreign 
arbitral awards. 
Although every U.S. state has its own law governing the enforceability 
of arbitration agreements and outcomes, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 
Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos., Inc. v. Dobson that the FAA preempts state 
law.9 In Dobson, an Alabama statute that prohibited the enforcement of 
 
 
 1. U.S. Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. 
§§ 1–13 (2000)). The original Act contained only the first chapter of the current statute. 
 2. Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225 (1987) (quoting Scherk v. 
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974)). 
 3. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
 4. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000). 
 5. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000). 
 6. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000). 
 7. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 
21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
 8. Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 17 
U.S.T. 1270, 14 I.L.M. 336. 
 9. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). 
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pre-dispute arbitration agreements was held to be preempted by the FAA, 
despite arguments to the contrary in an amicus brief filed by twenty state 
attorneys general.10 The court reasoned that Congress’s power to preempt 
state arbitration laws was based on the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.11 The Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the FAA 
preempted a state statute requiring arbitration provisions to be printed in 
underlined, capital letters on the first page of contracts, even though the 
intent of the law was to ensure informed consent to arbitration 
provisions.12 Therefore, when evaluating the law governing arbitration in 
the United States, it is appropriate to focus on the FAA and how it has 
been interpreted by the courts. 
While the evolution of FAA jurisprudence in specific contexts will be 
explained in greater detail below, it is worth noting at the outset that 
arbitration under the FAA has grown drastically beyond what its drafters 
intended, which was only to protect the procedural rights of contracting 
parties.13 The FAA has instead become a “national regulatory statute.”14 In 
the words of retired U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 
“over the past decade, the [Supreme] Court has abandoned all pretense of 
ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration 
Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation.”15 This 
view has also been expressed by scholars such as Susan Karamanian: “As 
a result of statutory mandate, or at times due to their own devices, U.S. 
courts have become imbedded in the international arbitration process. . . . 
[T]he judicial landscape is far from clear.”16 
 
 
 10. Id. at 272. 
 11. Id. at 273–74. 
 12. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683, 687 (1996). In this case, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed the Montana Supreme Court’s decision that a Montana Subway sandwich 
shop franchisee would not have to travel to the franchisor’s location in Connecticut because the form 
contract did not follow Montana’s specifications for font size and location of arbitration provisions in 
the contract. See Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1994), rev’d 517 U.S. 681 (1996).  
 13. See Maye v. Smith Barney, 897 F. Supp. 100, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 14. Jack Wilson, “No-Class-Action Arbitration Clauses,” State-Law Unconscionability, and the 
Federal Arbitration Act: A Case for Federal Judicial Restraint and Congressional Action, 23 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 737, 849 (2004) (citing IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: 
REFORMATION-NATIONALISM-INTERNATIONALIZATION 83 (1992)). 
 15. Dobson, 513 U.S. at 283 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 
493 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).  
 16. Susan L. Karamanian, The Road to the Tribunal and Beyond: International Commercial 
Arbitration and the United States Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 17, 17–19 (2002). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss1/4
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III. THE POLISH LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ARBITRATION  
In Poland, both domestic and international arbitration are regulated by 
the Code of Civil Procedure, which was enacted in 1964.17 On July 28, 
2005, the Polish Parliament passed a completely new set of regulations 
concerning arbitration, which have been in effect since October 2005. The 
changes liberalized the legal framework of arbitration and were based on 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) Model Law.18 The references below are to the new articles 
introduced into the Polish Kodeks Postepowania Cywilnego, or Civil 
Procedure Code. 
Some new provisions clarified previously ambiguous issues, including 
when courts may nullify agreements to arbitrate. For example, having a 
power of attorney now clearly includes the power to enter into binding 
arbitration agreements.19 In the context of a comparison between Polish 
and U.S. standards, it is particularly interesting to note that the Polish Civil 
Procedure Code voids contractual provisions that give unequal power to 
parties to an arbitration, including provisions that entitle only one party to 
opt for arbitration.20 
Other changes relate to the arbitrability of disputes. All asset-related 
disputes are now arbitrable except for those involving child support 
payments.21 Disputes within corporations, cooperatives and associations 
are now arbitrable.22 A corporation and its shareholders are bound by 
arbitration clauses in the articles of association,23 and disputes between 
Polish parties will be arbitrable in foreign arbitration courts.24 In addition, 
labor and employment law disputes are now arbitrable, but only if a 
written agreement to arbitrate is entered into after the dispute begins.25 
Several new provisions involve arbitral jurisdiction and procedures. 
Parties now have complete freedom to determine the composition of 
 
 
 17. Kodeks Postepowania Cywilnego [Civil Procedure Code](Pol.) [hereinafter Polish Civil 
Procedure Code]. 
 18. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), Annex I at 81, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, annex 1 
(June 21, 1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. 
 19. Polish Civil Procedure Code, supra note 17, art. 1167. 
 20. Id. art. 1161, § 2. 
 21. Id. art. 1157. 
 22. Id. art. 1163 
 23. Id. art. 1163, § 1. 
 24. See id. arts. 1154–56. 
 25. Id. art. 1164. 
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arbitral tribunals and to select arbitrators.26 Parties also have the ability to 
determine rules and procedures, as long as all parties are treated equitably 
by such procedures.27 Also, retired state judges are now allowed to serve 
as arbitrators.28 In the context of this Article, it is especially noteworthy 
that the new provisions adopt the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz, 
which means that an arbitral tribunal is able to decide for itself whether it 
has jurisdiction over a matter and whether an arbitration agreement is 
valid.29 Consistent with the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz, the 
invalidation or expiration of an agreement that includes an arbitration 
clause will not necessarily mean that the agreement to arbitrate is invalid 
or has expired.30 
The new provisions also address applicable law and when awards 
should be set aside. Arbitrators can adjudicate disputes according to the 
applicable law and in accordance with the agreement between the parties 
and established customs.31 If so empowered by the parties, arbitrators may 
rule according to general legal or moral principles.32 The possible grounds 
for setting aside an arbitral award closely resemble the provisions of 
Article V of the New York Convention of 1958.33 The only means of 
challenging an arbitral ruling is to have the ruling overturned in court. An 
award will be set aside only if there was no valid arbitration clause, if 
there was procedural unfairness such that a party was unable to present its 
case, if Polish law prohibits the arbitration of the subject matter, or if the 
award violates fundamental principles of justice.34 Parties have three 
months from the date of the arbitral decision to appeal.35 
Finally, the new provisions streamline the acknowledgement and 
enforcement of arbitral awards. Previously, enforcement proceedings 
included two stages, which increased the time required to obtain a 
judgment. The new rules outline two distinct procedures. In the first, a 
party may simply seek an acknowledgement, such as a confirmation of the 
arbitrator’s decision regarding the meaning of a contract term. In the 
second, a party may seek enforcement, such as the recovery of monetary 
damages. In either case, a party must bring the matter to a court. In the 
 
 
 26. Id. art. 1169. 
 27. Id. art. 1183. 
 28. Id. art. 1170, § 2. 
 29. Id. art. 1180, § 1. 
 30. Id. art. 1180, § 1. 
 31. Id. art. 1194. 
 32. Id.  
 33. New York Convention, supra note 7. 
 34. Polish Civil Procedure Code, supra note 17, arts. 1205–07. 
 35. Id. art. 1208. 
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first instance, the court may acknowledge the arbitral determination, 
issuing the decision in a closed session. In the second case, the court issues 
an executory order.36 
A separate article controls the acknowledgement and enforcement of 
rulings and settlements by foreign arbitrators. In such cases, a party must 
still go to a court to have an award acknowledged or enforced.37 The 
grounds for refusing to recognize or enforce an award are essentially the 
same as in domestic cases.38 Namely, a court may refuse to recognize or 
enforce a foreign arbitral award on the grounds that there was no valid 
agreement to arbitrate, there was procedural unfairness, the award was 
overturned by a court in a relevant foreign jurisdiction, the subject of the 
arbitration is inarbitrable under Polish law, or the award violates 
fundamental principles of justice.39 
IV. HOW U.S. AND POLISH LAW DIFFER 
A. Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
In the U.S., the question of whether an arbitral body has jurisdiction 
over a dispute is typically one that courts decide, in accordance with the 
FAA. The alternative approach, prevalent throughout most of the world 
and prominent in most internationally-recognized rules of arbitration,40 is 
 
 
 36. Id. art. 1214. 
 37. Id. art. 1215. 
 38. Id. art. 1205. 
 39. Id.  
 40. The UNCITRAL Rules of Arbitration state that “[t]he arbitral tribunal shall have the power 
to rule on objections that it has no jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence 
or validity of the arbitration clause or of the separate arbitration agreement.” Arbitration Rules of the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. 
A/31/17 (1976). The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules of Arbitration allow a court to 
determine whether an agreement to arbitrate exists; if so, all other decisions related to jurisdiction are 
for the arbitral tribunal to decide. International Chamber of Commerce, Rules of Arbitration, art. 6(2), 
ICC No. 808 (Jan. 1, 1998). The Arbitration Rules of the International Center for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the American Arbitration Association (AAA) International 
Arbitration Rules likewise give arbitral tribunals the power to rule on their own jurisdiction, including 
objections with respect to the existence of the arbitration agreement. ICSID, Rules of Procedure for 
Arbitration Proceedings, ch. 4, rule 41(1), ICSID/15 (Apr. 2006), available at http://www.worldbank. 
org/icsid/basicdoc/basicdoc.htm American; AAA, International Dispute Resulution Procedures, art. 15 
(Sept. 1, 2007), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28144#introduction. The London Court of 
International Arbitration (LCIA) Rules state that “[b]y agreeing to arbitration under these Rules, the 
parties shall be treated as having agreed not to apply to any state court or other judicial authority for 
any relief regarding the Arbitral Tribunal’s jurisdiction or authority . . . .” LCIA, LCIA Arbitration 
Rules, art. 23.4 (Jan. 1, 1998), available at http://www.lcid.org/ARB_folder/ARB_DOWNLOADS/ 
ENGLISH/rules.pdf. 
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known as kompetenz-kompetenz.41 Stated simply, this principle gives 
arbitrators the power to decide their own jurisdiction.42 The UNCITRAL 
Model Law endorses the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz,43 allowing a 
limited period of expedited court review to appeal jurisdictional questions. 
Poland has adopted the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz, as proposed by 
the UNCITRAL Model Law, providing an arbitral tribunal not only the 
power to decide questions of its own jurisdiction, but also to decide 
whether an arbitration agreement is valid and effective. Consistent with 
the doctrine of kompetenz-kompetenz, the invalidity or expiration of a 
contract does not in itself cause an arbitration agreement contained therein 
to be invalid or to expire. 
In the U.S., the question of whether an arbitral tribunal has the power 
to decide questions regarding its own jurisdiction has become obfuscated 
recently by the Supreme Court’s decision in First Options of Chicago, Inc. 
v. Kaplan.44 While the Court confirmed that in the U.S., courts will decide 
challenges to the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals,45 it carved out an 
exception which has proven to be the source of confusion and 
inconsistency. The exception arises where there is “clear and unmistakable 
evidence” that the parties intended to submit the arbitrability issue to 
arbitration.46 In such a situation, a court must give “considerable leeway to 
the arbitrator, setting aside his or her decision only in certain narrow 
circumstances.”47  
One could interpret the First Options exception to be nudging U.S. 
jurisprudence toward a position more consistent with kompetenz-
 
 
 41. The doctrine originated in German courts, and hence, while the term “competence-
competence” is sometimes used in the U.S., the doctrine is most frequently referred to by its German 
name. Natasha Wyss, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan: A Perilous Approach to Kompetenz-
Kompetenz, 72 TUL. L. REV. 351, 352 n.3 (1997) (citing Frank-Bernd Weigand, The UNCITRAL 
Model Law: New Draft Arbitration Acts in Germany and Sweden, 11 ARB. INT'L 398, 404 (1995)). 
 42. China Minmetals Materials Import and Export Co., Ltd. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 287 
(3d Cir. 2003). 
 43. HOWARD M. HOLTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE UNCITRAL MODEL 
LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND COMMENTARY 
480 (1989). 
 44. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).  
 45. Id. at 947–49. 
 46. Id. at 944 (internal quotations omitted). 
 47. Id. at 943. The Supreme Court followed First Options with their opinion in Green Tree 
Financial v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453–54 (2003), where the Court found that, in the consumer loan 
context, arbitrators should be allowed exclusive authority to decide whether claimants can procede 
collectively when their arbitration agreements are silent on the issue of class arbitration, potentially 
signalling that the movement toward allowing arbitrators more discretion over their jurisdiction is 
stronger than many imagined at the time of First Options. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss1/4
p 87 Sulkowski book pages.doc12/12/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2008] THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 95 
 
 
 
 
kompetenz,48 but by (1) stating this as an exception to the U.S. default rule 
and (2) failing to reconcile this exception with the language of the FAA,49 
the opinion has generated scholarly critique and inconsistent opinions in 
the Courts of Appeals.50 Conflict among the circuits has emerged in the 
context of contracts in the securities industry, which include a six-year 
limit on the eligibility of disputes for arbitration. Some circuits interpret 
this threshold issue of arbitrability to be a question for the courts in the 
absence of evidence of contrary intentions of the parties.51 Other circuits 
have interpreted this six-year limit as a matter for arbitrators to decide, per 
the First Options opinion.52 
The most credible resolution to this problem is to eliminate the basis 
for inconsistency through legislative reform. The FAA states that courts 
must resolve questions of arbitral jurisdiction, so it would be improper for 
even the Supreme Court to attempt to contradict the clear text of this law. 
Therefore, Congress should pass legislation to reform the FAA and clearly 
state the situations where arbitral bodies may decide questions of their 
own jurisdiction, and when and how such controversies may be resolved 
by the courts.  
B. Arbitrability of Employment Disputes 
As stated above, employment disputes are only arbitrable in Poland if 
the agreement is entered into after the dispute arises. In the U.S., a pre-
dispute agreement to arbitrate may be enforced in the context of 
employment law. However, there are some important caveats to this 
general rule. Most significantly, state contract law will provide a basis for 
 
 
 48. Some have pointed out that previously there were limited circumstances in which U.S. courts 
would allow arbitrators to decide their own jurisdiction if so allowed by the arbitration rules adopted in 
the arbitration agreement. See Conrad K. Harper, The Options in First Options: International 
Arbitration and Arbitral Competence, 771 PLI/COMM 127, 141–43 (1998). 
 49. First Options, 514 U.S. at 943. 
 50. Adriana Dulic, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan and the Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
Principle, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 77, 85–91 (2002); Wyss, supra note 41, at 360–61; Shirin Philipp, 
Is the Supreme Court Bucking the Trend? First Options v. Kaplan in Light of European Reform 
Initiatives in Arbitration Law, 14 B.U. INT'L L.J. 119, 124–26 (1996). 
 51. The Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have held that a court must decide the 
applicability of a time limitation because such a bar is a substantive eligibility requirement. See, e.g., 
Smith Barney Inc. v. Schell, 53 F.3d 807, 809 (7th Cir. 1995); Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells, 957 
F.2d 509, 514 (7th Cir. 1992); PaineWebber Inc. v. Farnam, 870 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 52. In contrast, the First, Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits either deemed the time limits to be a 
procedural question for arbitrators to decide or found clear and obvious intent on the part of the parties 
to be bound to the decisions of arbitrators as to such a decision. See, e.g. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. 
v. Boone, 47 F.3d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 1995); FSC Sec. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310, 1312 (8th Cir. 
1994). 
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nonenforcement of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate in the context of 
employment law, but the standard for defining such situations is 
ambiguous. To fully understand how this ambiguity could arise, a brief 
review of the relevant jurisprudence is required. 
It would appear that the text of the FAA does not ensure that pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in the context of employment law would be 
enforced. Excluded from the coverage of the FAA are “contracts of 
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers 
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”53 Some observers believe that 
Congress did not intend for the FAA to reach beyond disputes between 
business people, arguing, for example that:  
It is hard to imagine any office accountable to an electorate who 
would openly avow the purpose of enabling those with economic 
power to diminish the enforceability of rights conferred by 
Congress and state legislatures on consumers, patients, employees, 
investors, shippers, passengers, franchisees, and shopkeepers.54 
Courts have come to similar conclusions regarding employment law 
statutes: 
[A]n employee who brings a claim against his employers . . . on 
behalf of the federal government should not be forced by unequal 
bargaining power to accept a forum demanded as a condition of 
employment by the very party on which he informed.55 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was among the courts that 
construed Section One of the FAA to not require the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements entered into as a condition of employment.56 Until 
2001, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.57 was the Supreme Court 
case that came closest to providing guidance on this point. The Gilmer 
 
 
 53. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
 54. Wilson, supra note 14, at 850 (citing Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and 
Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 402). For other authorities arguing that the FAA was intended to 
apply to merchants of roughly equal bargaining power, see, e.g., Margaret M. Harding, The 
Redefinition of Arbitration by those with Superior Bargaining Power, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 857 (1999).  
 55. Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 121 F. Supp. 2d 643, 647 (N.D. Ohio 2000). On appeal, the 
circuit court held that aside from the question of whether the matter under a federal statute is 
arbitrable, a fundamental question existed as to whether there was valid assent by the employee to the 
arbitration agreement and whether the agreement covered such a situation. Nguyen v. City of 
Cleveland, 312 F.3d 243, 246 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 56. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, 1072 (9th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Circuit 
City]. 
 57. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
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decision required a registered securities representative to arbitrate his Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claim.58 Since the agreement 
to arbitrate was in the securities registration document and not an 
employment contract, the Supreme Court stated that it need not interpret 
Section One of the FAA in the context of employment disputes at that 
time.59  
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, a retailer sued in federal court in 
California to block a sales employee’s discrimination action in state 
court.60 Circuit City asked the district court to require the employee to 
arbitrate his claims under the FAA.61 Circuit City argued that the 
arbitration clause in their standardized employment contract should be 
enforced.62 The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order for 
arbitration on the grounds that all employment contracts were excluded 
from enforcement under the FAA, a position that was in conflict with all 
other circuits to have addressed the question, yet based on an 
understandable and credible reading of the FAA’s Section One.63  
The Supreme Court ruled that the exceptions in Section One of the 
FAA were intended to apply only to transportation workers, whose 
employment disputes were subject to regulation under other statutes, such 
as the Railway Labor Act.64 The Court held that all other employment 
contracts are subject to Section Two of the FAA, which permits federal 
courts to enforce arbitration agreements in any “contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce.”65 
However, the Circuit City II decision is silent on vital questions, such 
as the consequence of the failure of an arbitration agreement to meet the 
 
 
 58. Id. at 27. 
 59. Id. at 25 n.2. 
 60. Circuit City, 194 F.3d at 1070. 
 61. Id. at 1071. 
62. Id. The arbitration clause read:  
I agree that I will settle any and all previously unasserted claims, disputes or controversies 
arising out of or relating to my application or candidacy for employment, employment and/or 
cessation of employment with Circuit City, exclusively by final and binding arbitration before 
a neutral Arbitrator. By way of example only, such claims include claims under federal, state, 
and local statutory or common law, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, including the amendments of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the law of contract and the law of 
tort.  
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109–10 (2001) (emphasis in original) 
[hereinafter Circuit City II].  
 63. Circuit City, 194 F.3d at 1071. 
 64. Circuit City II, 532 U.S. at 121. 
 65. Id. at 123. 
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requirements of an enforceable contract or situation in which arbitral 
procedures are not as protective of statutory rights as the rules of civil 
procedure of the courts. 
Therefore, courts still have some latitude to find that an agreement to 
arbitrate an employment dispute would be unconscionable. The Third 
Circuit came to such a conclusion in Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Services 
VI, Inc.66 In that case Parilla, a dismissed employee, sued her former 
employer for violations of Title VII and Titles 10 and 24 of the Virgin 
Islands Code, wrongful discharge, breach of contract, misrepresentation 
and negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress.67 In 
response to IAP’s motion to compel arbitration, the district court adopted 
its previous reasoning in Plaskett v. Bechtel International, Inc.68 On 
appeal, the Third Circuit adopted its own prior logic, expressed in 
Alexander v. Anthony Int'l L.P.,69 namely, that if employment contracts are 
enforceable to the same extent as any other contracts, then unconscionable 
employment contracts cannot be enforced.70  
The Parilla case is especially instructional because it reveals the 
complexity and uncertainty of decisions regarding the conscionability of 
arbitration clauses in employment contracts. The Third Circuit ruled on six 
questions pertaining to the conscionability of the arbitration clause. First, 
it decided that a thirty-day notice provision, requiring the presentation of a 
written complaint to the company within thirty days of a dispute, was 
unconscionable.71 Second, it ruled that requiring each side to “bear its own 
costs and expenses, including attorney's fees” was unconscionable.72 The 
Third Circuit, however, disagreed with the district court and deemed a 
confidentiality provision conscionable.73 Both the Third Circuit and the 
district court agreed that the provision requiring disputes to be arbitrated, 
rather than resolved in court or through an administrative agency, was 
conscionable.74 In addition, both courts found that a provision prohibiting 
the selection of a resident of the Virgin Islands as arbitrator was 
conscionable.75  
 
 
 66. Parilla v. IPA Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 67. Id. at 273. 
 68. Plaskett v. Bechtel Int’l, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 334 (D.V.I. 2003) 
 69. Alexander v. Anthony Int’l L.P., 341 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 70. Parilla, 368 F.3d at 275–76. 
 71. Id. at 277–78. 
 72. Id. at 278–79. 
 73. Id. at 281. 
 74. Id. at 282. 
 75. Id. at 283.  
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Finally, the Third Circuit remanded to the district court the question of 
whether to sever the unenforceable provisions from the rest of the 
agreement to arbitrate or to wholly invalidate the entire agreement: 
The existence of multiple unconscionable provisions will not 
always evidence “serious moral turpitude” or serious misconduct, 
precluding enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate. That will 
depend on whether the number of such provisions and the degree of 
the unfairness support the inference that the employer was not 
seeking a bona fide mechanism for dispute resolution, but rather 
sought to impose a scheme that it knew or should have known 
would provide it with an impermissible advantage.76  
The case of Hooters v. Philips is the textbook case for such a 
scenario.77 There, the Fourth Circuit found that an agreement to arbitrate 
included so many unfair arbitral procedures that it rendered the entire 
agreement to arbitrate unenforceable.78 
Here we see a huge potential for inconsistency in the U.S. approach to 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the employment law context. To 
judge the unconscionability of arbitration procedures requires application 
of contract law. Each of the fifty state jurisdictions has its own body of 
contract law case law. This fact may result in some inconsistency among 
jurisdictions as to what qualifies as conscionable, especially when one 
takes into account the individual sympathies of various judges. Indeed, 
some inconsistencies have emerged among the circuits already. For 
example, in some jurisdictions, an employment agreement that limits the 
available damages may not be enforced,79 while in others it will be.80  
C. Remedies for Agreements that are Unconscionable  
As explained above, the Polish Code of Civil Procedure renders void 
any contractual provision that allocates unequal power, including an 
agreement that allows one party to choose whether to arbitrate. U.S. cases 
involving unconscionability as grounds for invalidating arbitration clauses 
in the employment law context, as discussed above, as well as other cases 
involving unconscionability, similarly cite unfair procedural provisions.81 
 
 
 76. Id. at 289. 
 77. Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 78. Id. at 938. 
 79. Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., 134 F.3d 1054, 1060 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 80. Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 552 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 81. For a discussion of U.S. cases using unconscionability to invalidate provisions in agreements 
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Thus, it is noteworthy that Polish law and U.S. law are roughly 
comparable when it comes to finding grounds to invalidate unfair 
procedural provisions or entire arbitration agreements. The key difference, 
as noted in the previous section, is that the ambiguity and inconsistency 
that characterize the issue of arbitrating employment disputes in the U.S. is 
eliminated in Poland by the new Code of Civil Procedure regulations. 
D. Consequences of a Foreign Tribunal’s Failure to Consider Applicable 
National Law 
As discussed above, Polish law does not provide that courts may set 
aside an arbitral award for failure to consider Polish national law. In 
contrast, one of the persistent mysteries of U.S. law is the “second look” 
doctrine established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth.82 In Mitsubishi, an auto distributor wanted to 
sue Mitsubishi under antitrust laws in court despite a pre-dispute 
agreement to arbitrate.83 The Supreme Court was convinced that a 
Japanese arbitrator, acting under Swiss choice-of-law rules, could apply 
U.S. antitrust laws.84 In its famous footnote 19, the Mitsubishi court 
addressed the concern that U.S. citizens may be deprived of important 
protections provided by U.S. statutes.85 Footnote 19 states that where 
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses operate together as a 
prospective waiver of statutory rights, the agreement should be struck 
down on public policy grounds.86 Further, footnote 19 states that if a 
foreign arbitral forum does not apply U.S. law in a situation where it ought 
to do so, U.S. courts could review the arbitral decision at the enforcement 
stage and refuse to enforce the arbitral outcome on the grounds that 
appropriate and applicable U.S. law was not considered.87 This ability to 
review the arbitral decision at the enforcement stage is the “second look” 
doctrine that has sparked so much controversy over the past two decades.  
The implications of Mitsubishi are an enduring mystery because, while 
scholars have spilt much ink in analyzing them88 and while courts have 
 
 
to arbitrate, see Mary Jane Groff, Where Can Unconscionability Take Arbitration? Why the Fifth 
Circuit’s Conscience Was Only Partially Shocked, 2005 J. DISP. RESOL. 131 (2005). 
 82. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985). 
 83. Id. at 619.  
 84. Id. at 633. 
 85. Id. at 637 n.19. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Dulic, supra note 50, at 86–87; Wilson, supra note 14; Lisa Sopata, Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.: International Arbitration and Antitrust Claims, 7 NW. J. INT’L 
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relied on them to greatly expand their deference to arbitral tribunals,89 
there has not been a single instance where a U.S. court used its “second 
look powers” to recognize—or to refuse to recognize—a foreign arbitral 
award. The “second look” doctrine is also controversial in that it does not 
appear to completely please either pro-arbitration advocates or individuals 
who are staunchly suspicious of secretive foreign forums applying U.S. 
public laws. On the one hand, Mitsubishi opened the door for a wide 
variety of statutes involving public policy to be interpreted and applied by 
private arbitral forums. In this sense, Mitsubishi is rightfully seen as 
conducive to private dispute resolution. On the other hand, Mitsubishi’s 
footnote 19 appears to have created a ground for non-recognition that does 
not appear in the New York Convention: namely, that aside from 
fundamental notions of fairness and justice, the mere fact that national law 
was not considered can serve as grounds for non-recognition. 
While footnote 19 of Mitsubishi and the “second look” doctrine have 
arguably been relegated to the status of dicta over the past two decades,90 
Mitsubishi’s “second look” doctrine has never been overruled or 
disavowed by the Supreme Court. Therefore, it is worth noting that in this 
regard, U.S. jurisprudence still retains a feature which is less conducive to 
arbitral outcomes than Polish law. Mitsubishi still raises questions as to the 
finality of international arbitral awards that may require enforcement in the 
U.S.  
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
The preceding comparison of the U.S. and Polish legal frameworks of 
arbitration reveals that in some instances, Polish law is currently more 
favorable to arbitration than U.S. law. Polish arbitration law is more 
favorable in that Polish arbitrators are explicitly allowed to decide whether 
they have jurisdiction to resolve a controversy and that there is no basis for 
invalidating international awards for failure to apply Polish law. 
Additionally, the new Polish framework contains a safeguard that appeals 
to common sense inasmuch as it protects parties with inferior bargaining 
power; namely, that pre-dispute arbitration agreements will not be 
 
 
L. & BUS. 595 (1986). 
 89. See, e.g., Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 541 (1995); 
Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1294 n.4 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525 U.S. 943 
(1998); George Fischer Foundry Sys., Inc. v. Adolph H. Hottinger Maschinenbau GmbH, 55 F.3d 
1206, 1210 (6th Cir. 1995); Simula v. Autoliv, 175 F.3d 716, 722–23 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 90. See, e.g., Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, 515 U.S. at 541; Richards, 135 F.3d at 1294 n.4; 
George Fischer Foundry Sys., 55 F.3d at 1210; Simula, 175 F.3d at 722–23. 
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enforced in the context of employment law. Such a safeguard appears to 
be absent from the legal framework of arbitration in the United States.  
Ultimately, this comparison of U.S. jurisprudence with Polish 
regulations also reveals the confusion and uncertainty that can characterize 
U.S. law. Some differences between states and circuits are of course 
inevitable due to the U.S. structure of federalism and its common law 
tradition, but the confusion and ambiguity are especially glaring in this 
context and are exacerbated by less-than-ideal legislative drafting.91 This 
is neither the first Article nor the last to argue that Congress should reform 
the FAA to address well-founded concerns.92 Specifically, Congress ought 
to clarify whether Congressional intent is that pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements in employment contracts are to be enforced, whether 
arbitrators have the ability to resolve challenges to their own jurisdiction, 
and whether arbitral awards may be nonenforceable if applicable U.S. laws 
are not considered by foreign arbitrators. 
 
 
 91. Karamanian, supra note 16, at 20 (“To a certain extent, inartful drafting in the [New York] 
Convention and/or in the Convention Act [which made the New York Convention’s provisions part of 
the FAA] has contributed to the varying judicial opinions. Also, an apparent lack of awareness of the 
intricacies of the treaty and the legislative scheme is at fault.”) Karamanian goes on to point out that 
the implementing legislation of the New York Convention fails to define elementary terms like 
“agreement in writing” and “arbitral award.” Karamanian also provides examples of contradictory 
court decisions, for example, on the issue of whether unsigned documents that include an arbitration 
clause amount to an agreement in writing. Id. at 62–74. Karamanian also points out the uncertainty as 
to whether an arbitral command to produce a document such as a tax return is an interim order or an 
arbitral award that can be enforced by a court. Id. at 93. 
 92. See, e.g., Dulic, supra note 50; Wilson, supra note 14; Sopata, supra note 82. 
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